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From Relative Truth to Finean Non-Factualism 
 
Alexander Jackson 





This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit 
Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a 
linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about 
the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a 
satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject 
to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non- factualism is the better 
relativist theory. As I explain, non-facualism about deliciousness is happily combined with an 
invariantist semantics for the word “delicious”. On this approach, relativism is a matter for a 





There are several theories in the broadly ‘relativist’ camp about matters of taste, such as whether the curry I made 
for dinner is delicious. This paper compares two such theories: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s (2001) non-
factualism about a subject-matter. I won’t address a third kind of relativism, the expressivism of Simon Blackburn 
(1993) and Allan Gibbard (2003). Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis, about how to 
model the contents of our utterances and judgements. The metaphysical underpinning of the theory is often 
neglected.1 What worldly states of affairs make a judgement true relative to one assessor but false relative to 
another? I will argue that no satisfactory underpinning can be given. By contrast, Finean non-factualism is in good 
metaphysical order. 
 
I start in §2 by explaining the core motivating thought behind relativism about deliciousness, which I label THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. While I defend its prima facie plausibility, I do not pretend to prove that 
some version of relativism about deliciousness is correct; my real question is which version of relativism is best. The 
paper focuses on relativism about deliciousness. At some points I will assume that the account of deliciousness 
should plausibly extend to relativism about morality. I will not assume that the account should extend to epistemic 
modals, for which the linguistic data are more complex.2 
 
§3 introduces the truth-relativist account of THE  EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE, and raises the question of 
which worldly states of affairs make it the case that a judgement is true relative to a given assessor. §§4 and 5 
distinguish two such views, arguing they are unsatisfactory. §6 describes the remaining option for the truth-relativist, 
and introduces Finean non-factualism about deliciousness. §7 compares the two views described in §6, arguing that 
Finean non-factualism is the more perspicuous and economical theory. Arguably, truth-relativists are motivated by 
the thought that relativism must be built into the semantics for the relevant parts of natural language. §8 undermines 
this motivation. I argue that non-factualism is compatible with an invariantist semantics for “delicious”. That semantic 
theory can take any form that linguists see fit; I’ll focus on the direct reference and model-theoretic approaches to 
semantics. In my view, it is not the job of linguistic theory to say whether relativism is true of deliciousness; it is a job 
for metaphysics. Finally, §9 elucidates Finean non-factualism by showing it casts light on some issues in metaphysics 
that are not directly related to relativism. 
 
                                                          
1 Exceptions include Boghossian (2010), Einheuser (2008), and Schafer (2014). 
2 As will emerge in §8, I think there is no distinctive linguistic data in the case of deliciousness and morality. Suppose there is distinctive linguistic 
data in the case of epistemic modals. Then plausibly the puzzling behaviour of epistemic modals should be treated by a linguistic theory, and 
relativism about deliciousness and morality by a non-linguistic theory (a metaphysical one). At the very least, we can’t assume that deliciousness 
and epistemic modals should receive a unified treatment. Recent work on epistemic modals includes the essays in Egan & Weatherson (2011), and 
MacFarlane (2014 chapter 10). 
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2. The Core Relativist Thought. 
 
Suppose my Dad and I share a curry for dinner. I enjoy the curry, and my Dad doesn’t (he doesn’t like spicy food). I 
exclaim, “This curry is delicious!” and my Dad replies, “No it isn’t.” The central aim of ‘relativist’ theories about 
deliciousness is to legitimize my making THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. 
 
(THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE) The curry is delicious.  My Dad’s judgement to the 
contrary is false, and in that sense wrong. But in a deeper, metaphysically serious sense, that’s 
merely what it is ‘correct’ for me to judge, because the curry tastes good to me. In the metaphysically 
serious sense it is ‘correct’ for my Dad to judge that the curry is not delicious, because the curry 
does not taste good to him. Neither of our judgements is metaphysically privileged. 
 
Plausibly, THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE glosses the motivation of contemporary truth-relativists, 
including: John MacFarlane (2014)3,4 Max Kölbel (2008 p. 250); Karl Schafer (2014 esp. §4)5; Peter Lasersohn (2005 
esp. pp. 649, 662); and Tamina Stephenson (2007 pp. 492–3). Setting aside the exegetical question, it is worth 
investigating whether truth-relativism legitimizes THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. If it doesn’t, truth-
relativism turns out to be a half-hearted kind of relativism.6 (In his 2003, Kölbel put the relativist thought by saying 
that my Dad and I are in a ‘faultless disagreement’. I don’t think it is enough to say my Dad is ‘not at fault’. That falls 
short of the idea that he judges ‘correctly’. Indeed, it is hard to hear the claim that my Dad is ‘not at fault’ without 
hearing an implication that though blameless, he is incorrect. That thought is compatible with taking there to be 
objective facts about what’s delicious, and so is not characteristic of relativism.) 
 
THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE assumes that my Dad and I disagree about whether the curry is delicious: 
we take opposing views on that single content.7 The assumption is attractive enough to be worth exploring. (Dissenters 
include Stojanovic 2007, Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009,8 and Sundell 2011.) Whereas truth-relativists typically infer 
the presence of disagreement from the felicity of certain dialogues, I present it as an intuitively correct psychological 
description. (Sophisticated arguments in linguistics might affect the ultimate attractiveness of holding my Dad and I 
disagree about a single content.9) Another motivation for exploring the hypothesis that my Dad and I disagree is that 
it would be nice to develop a view that can be extended to the case of morality (that’s the endgame here, right?). It is 
compelling that people disagree about the truth of certain moral claims. 
 
                                                          
3 MacFarlane (2014) initially presents the idea as the imperative to call something delicious if it is pleasing to you, and call it not delicious if it is 
not pleasing to you (p. 4; cf. pp. 21–2). He calls an assertion in line with that imperative ‘permitted’ (pp. 103–111), ‘correct’ (pp. 73, 200, 306), 
and ‘right’ (p. 195). (For reasons I won’t go into, MacFarlane (2014 pp. 103–111) says the relativist also gives a distinctive account of when an 
assertion must be retracted.) 
4 MacFarlane might have endorsed something like THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE earlier work (2007 pp. 28–9). Whether or not 
MacFarlane (2007 pp. 22–5) had it in mind, consider the alternative view that correctness (in the deep sense) is relative to an assessor. This approach 
says that relative to me, I’m correct and my Dad’s incorrect; relative to my Dad, I’m incorrect and   he’s correct. On this approach, there is no 
perspective relative to which both judgements are correct. But that’s just not what we want to say. Consider an alternate case in which someone 
replaces our food with a very bland curry without my Dad or I yet noticing. In the original case, our judgements of deliciousness reflect our own 
tastes; in this alternate case, our judgements about whether the curry will be delicious are contrary to our own tastes. If correctness is relative to an 
assessor, then both the original and alternate cases are ones in which my Dad’s judgement is correct relative to one of us and incorrect relative to 
the other. But surely our judgements are worse off in the alternate case than in the original case. Surely the original case is one in which we both 
judge correctly in the metaphysically serious sense, and the alternate case is one in which we both judge incorrectly. 
5 Schafer says that in the crucial sense, what it is ‘permissible’ to judge is determined by the judge’s tastes (2014 p. 19). He refuses to call permissible 
judgements ‘correct’, but I don’t think anything deep rests on the point. 
6 I criticize a less demanding desideratum for relativism at the end of §5. 
7 MacFarlane (2014 chapter 6) claims that there isn’t a single intuitive notion of disagreement about a content. I disagree. 
8 The intuition that we disagree remains strong when we follow Cappelen & Hawthorne’s recommendation not to rely on intuitions about generics, 
such as whether curry is delicious (not just this one) (2009 pp. 107–9, 111–4). They claim that when I consider that there is a deep sense in which 
my Dad judges ‘correctly’, my intuition that we disagree goes away (2009 pp. 119–20). But suppose I am pondering the deeper sense in which my 
Dad judges ‘correctly’. Still, if asked whether I disagree with my Dad about whether the curry is delicious, it seems that I do. I may then say that 
our disagreement isn’t a ‘deep’ one, as the matter is ‘subjective’ or ‘relative’, in a sense that needs explaining, as this paper attempts to do. Cappelen 
& Hawthorne also point out that judges realize they shouldn’t disagree about whether Ovaltine is delicious, if their pleasure at drinking Ovaltine 
differs only because one of them always eats dates beforehand, and the other eats chickpeas first (p. 118). The observation is compatible with 
motivating relativism: those judges should agree that Ovaltine is delicious when drunk after eating dates, and disgusting when drunk after eating 
chickpeas; no such agreement between my Dad and I suggests itself. 
9 Lasersohn (2009) and Kölbel (2009) give linguistic arguments for an approach on which my Dad and I disagree, and Schaffer (2011 §2) gives 
linguistic arguments to the contrary. 
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THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE uses two notions of ‘correct’ judgement. In the first sense that appears, 
a judgement is ‘correct’ if it is true and ‘incorrect’ if false.  Truth and falsity, in this ordinary sense, are ‘minimal’: <it 
is true that p> is equivalent to <p>, and <it is false that p> is equivalent to <not-p>. The metaphysical action lies in 
the second notion of correctness, according to which my Dad makes the ‘correct’ judgement for him to make, and I 
make the ‘correct’ judgement for me to make, though we thereby disagree. It is these claims, involving the second 
notion of correctness, that are meant to distinguish relativism from objectivism about deliciousness. I will label the 
relevant notion, which is involved in getting a metaphysical understanding of how our judgements engage with reality, 
‘metaphysical correctness’. All relativists must deny CORRESPONDENCE: 
(CORRESPONDENCE) It is metaphysically correct for a person J to judge that p iff: p. 
 
For according to THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE, our judgements are both ‘correct’, but they are not 
both true. Objections to relativism that unreflectively assume CORRESPONDENCE fail to consider the view 
seriously.10 On the other hand, more needs to be said to give us a handle on metaphysically correctness, given that it 
is distinct from truth. 
 
Note that the attraction to saying that my Dad judges ‘correctly’ may derive from an argument, rather than a raw 
intuition. MacFarlane (2014 pp. 2–7) gives one such argument; the following footnote gives another.11 It becomes 
important that relativism need not be immediately intuitive when we consider extending it to other domains, such as 
knowledge (MacFarlane 2014 chapter 8) and morality. 
 
My aim is not to show that THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE must be respected, but to compare the truth-
relativist and Finean non-factualist attempts to do so. Nevertheless, let me rebut a simple argument that THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE is incoherent. Paul Boghossian complains that it is “simply obvious” that if 
my Dad and I both “count as having spoken correctly,” then we do not disagree (2010 p. 66). To press the thought: if 
we can both recognize that the other speaks correctly too, what disagreement is left? I think this objection rests on 
equivocating between the two notions of correctness in play. Given that I judge that the curry is delicious and my Dad 
judges it isn’t, our differing tastes also make it metaphysically correct for each of us to affirm that the other judges 
falsely, and is in that sense wrong. Plausibly, that’s all it is for us to legitimately disagree about whether the curry is 
delicious. Our agreement about a different matter (namely which judgements are metaphysically correct) does not 
remove our disagreement about the matter of taste. It seems relativism can make sense of our disagreeing. However, 
I will argue that some versions of truth-relativism are deeply in tension with the existence of such disagreement. 
 
3. Introducing Truth-Relativism. 
 
Truth-relativists claim that propositions and judgements are true relative to a parameter, such as an assessor or a 
gustatory standard. In order to ground THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE, they replace 
CORRESPONDENCE with the following principle. 
 
(TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE) It is metaphysically correct for a person J to judge 
that p iff: p is true relative to J. 
                                                          
10 Crispin Wright says that being on one side of a disagreement makes impossible “the kind of even-handed assessment of [the] disagreement that 
relativism ought intuitively to make possible” (2008 p. 183). He claims that there is no way to have “the appropriate kind of equality of respect for 
contrasting opinions,” as one is “stuck with an opinion of [one’s] own on the matter in question” (p. 181). This assumes CORRESPONDENCE. 
Mark Richard thinks it refutes relativism to observe that I am committed to thinking that my Dad is “mistaken”, because “if you have a false belief, 
you are mistaken” (2008 p. 132). This objection assimilates the relativist’s two notions of correctness, i.e. assumes CORRESPONDENCE. Carol 
Rovane also assimilates the two notions of correctness, charging that THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE incoherently claims that my 
Dad is and is not wrong (Rovane 2010 p. 48). 
11 There is a raw intuition that my Dad and I disagree about whether the curry is delicious (possibly supported by linguistic arguments). We may 
then argue that my Dad judges ‘correctly’ by rejecting non-reductive and reductive realism about deliciousness, and the error theory. Maybe we 
reject non-reductive realism on the grounds that irreducible facts about what’s delicious are not naturalistically respectable. Then we reject reductive 
realism about deliciousness, according to which what’s delicious is determined by what the majority of people find delicious (or: what chemical 
property “delicious” refers to is determined by what the majority find delicious). For if reductive realism were true, then finding out that the majority 
of people disagree with you about whether American ‘domestic’ beer is delicious would force you to change your mind on the  matter; but one is 
not forced by metaphysical considerations to adopt the majority view on such matters. One can dismiss the majority as plebians (cf. Lasersohn 2005 
pp. 651–2). Finally, we take it to be an undeniable piece of common-sense that the curry is delicious (or whatever dish or beverage you enjoy), so 
we reject the error theory. We conclude that judgements of deliciousness do not “aim to correspond to some objective fact of the matter”; rather 
they “aim to reflect the tastes of the judge”. So in the deep sense, my Dad is ‘correct’ to judge that the curry is not delicious. 
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For example, the truth relativist says that the proposition that <the curry is delicious> is true relative to me, but its 
negation is true relative to my Dad. Invoking TRUTH- RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE, the truth-relativist claims 
to have thus explained why our conflicting judgements are both ‘correct’ in the metaphysically serious sense. (See the 
citations given in §2.) 
 
I will argue against the truth-relativist account of THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. Truth-relativism is a 
view about propositional contents and judgements; it assigns a certain status to representational entities of those kinds. 
It is natural to wonder how the relative truth of representational entities relates to what reality itself is like. Which 
worldly states of affairs make a judgement true relative to one assessor but false relative to another? I distinguish three 
possible answers to this question. Two answers appeal to facts about what’s delicious, relativized in distinct ways; I 
call these views relationalism and holding-relativism. The third answer does not appeal to relativized facts about 
what’s delicious, but rather uses the psychological facts about what people enjoy eating to explain the relative truth 
of a content or judgement. I call this third view unworldly truth-relativism about deliciousness.12 §§4–7 argue against 
each of those approaches. (There is a standard argument in the literature that truth-relativism does not secure 
disagreement between my Dad and I. I explain why it is not convincing in §6.) 
 
4. Truth-Relativism Grounded in Relationalism. 
 
Relationalism about deliciousness is the most obvious way to relativize the facts about what’s delicious. It says that 
deliciousness is a two-placed relation, which holds between a dish and a person, rather than a property as one naively 
thinks it to be. (One might think that such a relation is just the psychological relation of a person’s enjoying a particular 
dish. If so, relationalist truth-relativism collapses into unworldly truth-relativism. I won’t help myself to this short-cut 
in arguing against all versions of truth-relativism.) 
 
The relationalist truth-relativist about deliciousness cannot endorse THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. The 
truth-relativist component of the view assumes that our ordinary judgements attribute a 1-placed property of 
deliciousness. For example, I judge that the curry is delicious simpliciter, and my Dad disagrees.13 But relationalism 
says deliciousness is 2-placed, not 1-placed. The view says it is not the case that anything is delicious simpliciter, 
contrary to my ordinary judgement. Relationalist truth-relativism implies that my ordinary attribution of deliciousness 
is defective, not correct in the metaphysically deep sense. So the view rejects THE EVENHANDEDNESS 
MONOLOGUE. The problem is that relationalism is a view about what’s delicious, and so can—and does— conflict 
with our ordinary judgements. 
 
Relationalist truth-relativism about deliciousness is a coherent view—just not one that legitimizes THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. The view implies that ordinary attributions of 1-placed deliciousness are 
simply wrong. The claim that ordinary judgements are true relative to their respective judges merely takes some of 
the sting out of that negative evaluation, showing how the attributions of deliciousness are at least in the ballpark of 
some fact. This view has some plausibility. (So does the analogous version of Angel Pinillos’ 2011 truth-relativism 
about judgements of duration made by people ignorant of modern physics.14) However, the project of this paper is to 
see if there’s a version of relativism that doesn’t require us to reject the relevant judgements as metaphysically 
defective. That’s partly because I am interested in finding a version of relativism that can also be applied to morality. 
So I set relationalist truth-relativism aside. 
                                                          
12 The view is ‘unworldly’ in that it does not appeal to worldly facts about what’s delicious. 
13 One might think that Stephenson (2007) is a relationalist truth-relativist who denies that our ordinary judgements attribute a 1-placed property 
of deliciousness. I don’t understand the view thus attributed to Stephenson. She thinks many attributions of deliciousness have the content that X is 
delicious PROJ, where PROJ is a “silent nominal item… that refers to the judge [i.e. the assessor]” (p. 500). Suppose those attributions take 
deliciousness to be a relation (not a 1-placed property). They relate a dish and…what? Neither a specific judge, nor a function from judges to 
themselves, are acceptable answers to that question. Maybe Stephenson is best interpreted as taking ordinary attributions of deliciousness to embed 
a metaphysical mistake (a view I explain in the following paragraph). 
14 A fast train makes a circular journey. According to modern physics, the duration of the journey is (in some sense) relative to a frame of reference: 
a clock on the train should record a shorter time than one on the platform. Pinillos (2011) argues that judges ignorant of the physics attribute 
unrelativized duration to the journey. He claims it is objectionably uncharitable to (merely) say such judgements are false (p. 66). Rather, such 
judgements are true relative to some frames of reference. The relationalist truth-relativist says it is not the case that a 2-placed duration relation 
holds between the journey and some length of time, contrary to our ordinary judgements of duration. Contra Pinillos, this suggests ordinary 
judgements of duration are defective attempts to get at facts of the form: the journey, t seconds, and frame F bear a 3-placed duration relation. Yet 
the ordinary judgements are in the ballpark of a truth, unlike judgements that someone is a witch. The relationalist attributes relative truth to 
unqualified attributions of duration to soften the blow of finding them all incorrect. 
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5 Truth-Relativism Grounded in Holding-Relativism. 
 
I think there is another way to relativize facts about what’s delicious, which I call ‘holding relativism’. Consider first 
the idea that the way things are is relative to a time. There are two ways to understand the fact that Ella was sat at 
10am. The relationalist about time says that the fact concerns the absolute holding of the sitting-at relation between 
Ella and the time 10am. The holding-relativist says that the state of affairs of [Ella’s being sat] holds relative to 10am. 
(As far as I can see, that’s the same as saying that the property of sitting was had-relative-to-10am by Ella.) The two 
views are different: only the relationalist holds the counter-intuitive view that there are no temporarily had properties, 
such as being sat. (Fine 2005 pp. 279–80 explores holding-relativism about time.) 
 
Let’s use ‘<p>’ to specify propositions, and ‘[p]’ to specify states of affairs. Relationalism about deliciousness says 
that there are no states of affairs like [the curry is delicious]; but there are states of affairs of the form [the curry is 
delicious to my Dad], which hold absolutely. Holding-relativism about deliciousness says that states of affairs like 
[the curry is delicious] hold relative to a person. Let us reserve the term ‘state of affairs’ for that which holds, either 
absolutely or relatively, such as n objects bearing an n- ary relation. Let us reserve the term ‘fact’ for the (relative or 
absolute) holding of a state of affairs. For example, the holding-relativist says that it is a fact that: [the curry is 
delicious] holds relative to me, and does not hold relative to my Dad. (If you think holding- relativism is incoherent, 
that just makes it easier to argue it can’t ground a satisfactory truth-relativism. I won’t help myself to this shortcut.) 
 
It is useful to think of holding-relativism as an unorthodox version of realism. ‘Crude realism’ takes it to hold 
absolutely that [the curry is delicious]. The crude realist about deliciousness posits one realm of fact concerning what’s 
delicious. The holding- relativist posits multiple realms of fact concerning what’s delicious, namely what’s delicious 
relative to me, relative to my Dad, and so on. 
 
To get the result that my Dad and I both judge ‘correctly’, the holding-relativist must say that it is only metaphysically 
serious to assess my Dad’s judgement against one of those realms of fact, namely the states of affairs that hold relative 
to him. But then it is hard to escape the thought that my Dad and I do not disagree. It is compelling that on this picture, 
our judgements concern15 different aspects of reality. My judgement concerns what’s delicious relative to me, and my 
Dad’s judgement concerns what’s delicious relative to him. So holding-relativism is deeply in tension with THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE’s assumption that my Dad and I disagree. The problem is that holding 
relativism is too close in subject-matter to the question of what’s delicious, and so can—and does—conflict with the 
ordinary way of assessing other people’s judgements. (It would be mistaken to reply that truth-relativists can give an 
account of disagreement according to which my Dad and I disagree: my point is that such an account seems 
incompatible with holding relativism.) 
 
The above line of thought is compelling in the most plausible case of holding- relativism, namely the relativity of the 
way things are to a time. Suppose that at 10am I judge that Ella is sitting, and at 11am my Dad judges that Ella is not 
sitting. Our judgements are to be assessed with respect to the states of affairs holding at different times (10am and 
11am respectively). My Dad and I clearly do not disagree.16 Further, it is plausible that we do not disagree because at 
10am, I judged that Ella was sitting then. That is, the time the judgement targets is built into the proposition assented 
to. It seems the holding-relativist should reject the ‘temporalist’ view that the propositional content of my judgement 
is just: <Ella is sitting>. The metaphysical question as to whether holding- relativism is true should not be confused 
with the question of what content to attribute to people’s mental states. Analogously, it is plausible that holding-




                                                          
15 I say our judgements ‘concern’ different aspects of reality, rather than that they are ‘about’ them, to allow for the ‘temporalist’ view of contents 
described (and rejected) in the next paragraph. 
16 Einheuser (2008) formulates a view like holding-relativism about deliciousness, calling it ‘factual relativism’. She admits that on such a view, 
my Dad and I are judging “about” different aspects of reality (p. 196). She says this is a lesser kind of disagreement than one over a single realm of 
fact, but is a kind of disagreement nevertheless (p. 193). I think the case of holding-relativism about time shows it is no kind of disagreement at all. 
17 I’m rejecting ‘non-indexical contextualism’ about deliciousness here (MacFarlane 2014 chs 4– 5). According to that view, the propositional 
content of my judgement is just that the curry is delicious, but my tastes nevertheless determine the truth or falsity of my judgement. On this view, 
I should think that my Dad’s judgement is true, though what he judges is false. I find that an unattractive combination. 
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Maybe the point should be put more subtly. I suggested at the end of §2 that legitimate disagreement is a matter of its 
being metaphysically correct for my Dad to think “No it isn’t—you’re wrong” when I say that the curry is delicious 
(and for me to respond similarly to him). Suppose my Dad and I agree that holding-relativism about deliciousness is 
true. We agree that [the curry is delicious] holds relative to me, and does not hold relative to him, and thus we both 
judge metaphysically correctly. Then it seems mistaken for each of us to judge that the other judges falsely—it is 
metaphysically incorrect for us to do so. Even if holding relativism allows that some judges do disagree about what’s 
delicious, it implies they shouldn’t. But endorsing the EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE requires endorsing the 
practice of disagreeing about what’s delicious: it should be metaphysically correct for me to judge that my Dad judges 
falsely. 
 
As an anonymous reviewer points out, truth-relativists might have a thinner conception of the kind of correctness 
TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE concerns. They might distinguish linguistic norms governing how the 
practice is actually conducted, from an evaluation of whether such a practice is sensible. So it would be ‘linguistically 
correct’ for my Dad to say that I judge falsely, even if holding relativism is true and such a linguistic practice is not 
sensible.18 Even if we can distinguish those two kinds of assessment, I think we should take THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE to concern metaphysical correctness, not a thinner kind of ‘linguistic’ 
correctness. This paper seeks a version of relativism that legitimizes the ways we think and talk about what’s delicious. 
It’s not enough to say that my Dad and I disagree, though only because we are ignorant of the true metaphysics of 
deliciousness. 
 
6. Introducing Unworldly Truth-Relativism and Finean Non-Factualism. 
 
Unworldly truth-relativism says that <the curry is delicious> is true relative to me, but denies that’s explained by a 
corresponding state of affairs concerning deliciousness (relativized in either of the two ways discussed). Rather the 
proposition that <the curry is delicious> is made true relative to me by psychological facts about what I enjoy eating.19 
Plausibly, unworldly truth-relativism is what the cited truth-relativists have in mind: they talk about what people enjoy 
and not about relativized facts about what’s delicious. Karl Schafer’s ‘Metaethical Perspectivalism’ is clearly 
unworldly truth-relativism about morality (2014 p. 80). 
 
I don’t think unworldly truth-relativism is refuted by the objection to holding- relativism about deliciousness. Holding 
relativism is a kind of realism: it explains the metaphysical correctness of our judgements about what’s delicious by 
appeal to facts about what’s delicious. That’s why it is compelling that our judgements are about those facts, with the 
consequence that my Dad and I don’t disagree. By contrast, unworldly truth-relativism explains the metaphysical 
correctness of our judgements about what’s delicious by appeal to psychological facts about our tastes. One fails to 
consider the view seriously if one complains that unworldly truth-relativism makes our judgements about our tastes. 
 
The following restatement may help.  THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE requires one’s metaphysical 
theory, which should find my Dad’s judgement to be ‘correct’, to be separate from one’s ‘first-order’ gustatory view, 
which should find my Dad’s judgement to be false (say I). Relationalist and holding-relativist truth relativism are 
unable to maintain the required separation. Relationalism and holding relativism are too close in subject-matter to 
first-order views, and so conflict with some aspect of our first-order practice. Unworldly truth relativism does not 
suffer from this defect. 
 
The unworldly truth-relativist can give the following attractive account of disagreement. Suppose that my Dad and I 
make our respective judgements about the curry, and my tastes make my judgement true relative to me. Then it is also 
true relative to me that my Dad judges falsely and is in that sense wrong. Similarly, it is true relative to my Dad that I 
judge falsely and am in that sense wrong. Plausibly, that’s all there is to my Dad and I disagreeing about whether the 
curry is delicious. 
  
                                                          
18 I am not sure whether the cited truth-relativists have this thin conception of ‘correctness’. Schafer says the relevant kind of correctness is that 
determined by the “fundamental linguistic or conceptual norms” (2014 p. 87). MacFarlane says that it is “constitutive” of assertion and judgement 
that they are governed by the relevant standard (2014 pp. 101–3). 
19 Unworldly truth-relativism need not deny that states of affairs concerning deliciousness obtain: it can be ‘minimalist’ about them. That is, the 
unworldly truth-relativist can say that <[the curry is delicious] holds absolutely> is true relative to me, but false relative to my Dad. The unworldly 
truth-relativist does not appeal to such states of affairs to explain the relative truth of propositions about what’s delicious. 
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There is a standard complaint in the literature that if TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE is true, then my Dad 
and I do not disagree, because our judgements ‘concern’ our different gustatory standards.20 I have argued that the 
complaint is a good one against holding-relativism, but fails against unworldly truth-relativism. 
 
(The complaint that TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE eliminates disagreement is typically pressed as 
follows (see footnote 21 for citations). Allegedly, the propositional contents of some of our judgements build in neither 
a possible world nor a time; such contents are only true or false relative to a world and time. But, goes the argument, 
speakers at different worlds and times do not thereby disagree when one affirms but the other denies such a content. 
For example, we don’t thereby disagree if I believe at 10am that Ella is sitting and you believe at 11am that she is not 
sitting. The objector says that given TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE, deliciousness must be treated 
analogously, implying my Dad and I do not disagree. MacFarlane (2014 chapters 4–5) now responds by rejecting the 
supposed analogy between the truth-relativist account of deliciousness and relativity to a world and time. I suggest 
getting off the boat earlier: truth is not relative to a world or time. Truth-relativists can and should say that times are 
part of the content of our judgements. Possible worlds usually are not; but contingent contents are not true or false 
relative to a world. They are absolutely true but could have been absolutely false (or vice versa). So I recommend 
truth-relativists adopt the position on worlds and times defended by Cappelen & Hawthorne in a book attacking truth- 
relativism (2009 pp. 3–4, 94–8). Whether one favours MacFarlane’s (2014) response or mine, the objection shows 
that reflection on worlds and times should in no way ‘soften us up’ for truth-relativism about deliciousness.) 
 
My objection to unworldly truth-relativism is that it is inferior to Kit Fine’s way of formulating ‘non-factualism’ about 
a subject-matter (Fine 2001). The Finean idea is to take THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE at face value, 
theorizing directly in terms of metaphysical correctness.21 Finean non-factualism about deliciousness simply says that: 
the curry tastes good to me, which makes it metaphysically correct for me to judge that it is delicious. The curry tastes 
bad to my Dad, which makes it metaphysically correct for him to judge that it is not delicious. 
 
Finean non-factualism and unworldly truth-relativism agree that a person’s tastes determine whether it is 
metaphysically correct for them to judge that the curry is delicious. Unworldly truth-relativism explains that claim 
using relative truth. (There are two ways to do so: either facts about relative truth form an intermediate metaphysical 
layer between people’s tastes and what it is metaphysically correct for them to judge; or else the metaphysical 
correctness of a judgement just is its truth relative to that judge.) By contrast, Finean non-factualism holds that we 
should not bring in relative truth to supplement the claims about metaphysical correctness. Rather, metaphysical 
correctness becomes the central notion used in metaphysical theorizing. (I’ll say more about the approach, and explain 
why it is methodologically sound, in §9.) 
 
Like the unworldly truth-relativist, the Finean non-factualist has a straightforward account of the disagreement 
between my Dad and I. Given that we make the relevant judgements, our differing tastes also make it metaphysically 
correct for each of us to think the other judges falsely and is (in that sense) wrong. On this approach, that’s all there 
is to my Dad and I disagreeing about whether the curry is delicious. Another way to put the point is that Finean non-
factualism has a quasi-realist, ‘projectivist’ feel, rather than a realist feel. There is nothing problematic about the idea 
that once one has ‘projected’ one’s tastes, judging things to be delicious or not, one assesses other people’s judgements 
for (minimal) truth and falsity by comparing their judgements to yours. So there is nothing problematic about my Dad 
and I disagreeing, given Finean non-factualism. 
 
  
                                                          
20 The complaint against TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE  is apparently endorsed in earlier work by MacFarlane (2007 pp. 22–5, cf. 
footnote 4 above; but not 2014 chapters 4–5), and by Francén (2010 pp. 23–7) and Dreier (2009 pp. 97–100). 
21 Fine describes non-factualism about morality thus: 
Of course, the obvious standard of correctness [for moral beliefs] will be nonfactual; for the correctness of the judgement 
that abortion is wrong, say, will simply amount to abortion’s being wrong…. But this nonfactual standard of correctness 
lives in the shadow, as it were, of a factual standard. ... So for the expressivist, for example, the factual standard of correctness 
for a judgement might be that it faithfully reflects one’s (possibly implicit) commitments…. (Fine 2001 p. 23) 
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I label a particular view that theorizes in terms of metaphysical correctness ‘Finean non-factualism’. Fine himself 
places some other requirements on a non-factualist account (2001 pp. 21–5). As I explain in the following footnote, I 
think Fine’s extra requirements are mistaken; I will ignore them.22 As I explain in §9, I also disagree with Fine about 
how best to develop the approach beyond the core stated above. Those matters won’t matter for comparing non-
factualism with unworldly truth-relativism. 
 
7. Comparing Unworldly Truth-Relativism to Finean Non-Factualism. 
 
I think two types of consideration favour Finean non-factualism over unworldly truth- relativism: Finean non-
factualism is the clearer and more economical theory. The considerations of clarity start with the observation that the 
truth-relativist must distinguish two notions of truth. The ordinary notion of truth is the ‘minimal’ one, according to 
which <it is true that p> is equivalent to <p>, and <it is false that p> is equivalent to <not-p>. In the ordinary sense, 
my Dad judges falsely (say I). Truth-relativism must not deny this; so it must be a theory about a different notion of 
truth, which I label ‘truth*’. (‘Truth’ seems like a fine label for the ordinary notion.) Truth-relativism claims that an 
attribution of deliciousness is not true* or false* simpliciter, but true* relative to one assessor and false* relative to 
another. On this approach, the proposition that <it is true that the curry is delicious> is true* relative to me, and false* 
relative to my Dad. MacFarlane (2014 pp. 37–9, 93–4), Schafer (2014 pp. 76–8), and Kölbel (2008 pp. 250–2) concede 
the above, granting that truth* is a technical notion. 
 
My first type of reason for preferring Finean non-factualism is that appealing to truth* makes THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE more confusing, not less. This manifests in two ways. Firstly, relativism must 
distinguish ordinary truth from metaphysical correctness. My Dad’s judgement is false (say I), but that’s irrelevant to 
whether it is ‘correct’ in the sense central to understanding the metaphysics of deliciousness. I think it hinders 
separating ordinary truth from metaphysical correctness to be told that the latter is a species of truth. (It certainly 
doesn’t help.) 
 
Secondly, it is bewildering hear that truth* is a species of truth, but fundamentally different from ordinary truth. Truth 
as ordinarily understood is not relative to a judge or anything else. That’s why so many philosophers are perplexed to 
hear that there is a species of truth that is relative to an assessor. It isn’t walking like a duck, or quacking like a duck; 
so it is confounding to be told that it is a kind of duck—just not the ordinary kind. (I don’t think the truth of propositions 
or utterances is relative to a possible world in any interesting sense; rather, what is absolutely true could have been 
absolutely false. The following footnote rebuts the reply that relative truth* is no more obscure than the notion of truth 
employed in standard intensional semantics, according to which a sentence-type is true relative to a context of use.23) 
 
I say that appeal to truth*, rather than simply to metaphysical correctness, makes relativism more opaque, not less. 
The cited truth-relativists are not in a good position to respond to this complaint. They explicate truth* in terms of 
metaphysical correctness (via TRUTH-RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE), not vice versa. (MacFarlane 2014 
chapter 5; Schafer 2014 §4; Kölbel 2008 p. 250.) They see that the task is to understand how my Dad and I both judge 
metaphysically correctly (see the citations in §2), and they admit that metaphysical correctness is more easily grasped 
than relative truth*. So how is it meant to help us understand THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE to bring 
in relative truth*? 
 
  
                                                          
22 Fine also requires the non-factualist to say in virtue of what people have beliefs about the subject- matter, without invoking the allegedly non-
factual elements. For example, the moral non- factualist must say in virtue of what people have beliefs about which acts are wrong, without invoking 
moral wrongness. That strikes me as neither necessary nor sufficient for non-factualism. It is not necessary, because one can think that facts about 
what people believe are fundamental, and do not hold in virtue of anything else, and yet still be a non-factualist about morality. It is not sufficient, 
as one can give a functionalist account of what it is to believe something to be good, without mentioning goodness itself, yet be a crude realist about 
goodness. (Dreier 2004 claims inspiration from Fine 2001, but focuses on what I’ve argued is the mistaken element in Fine’s characterization of 
non-factualism.) 
23 Intensional semantics employs the notion of a sentence-type being true in a context. This notion (truth3) is not obscure, because it is intimately 
related to ordinary propositional truth (truth1) and utterance truth (truth2) as follows. Firstly: utterance u is true2 iff u is an utterance of some 
sentence-type s such that s is true3 in the context of utterance of u. Secondly: utterance u is true2 iff u says that p and p is true1. Relative truth* 
cannot be thus domesticated. See Kölbel (2008 §2) for more details. (I am not persuaded by Kölbel’s claim (2008 §3) that relative truth* is not 
obscure because it overlaps with ordinary truth for objective matters.) 
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Let me add a final variant of the first type of complaint. Given that truth* relative to a judge is not explained by 
relativized facts about what’s delicious, it can only be a kind of assertibility for that judge (it seems to me). That is, 
truth* relative to a judge is best understood as what it is metaphysically correct for the judge to affirm. But then why 
call it relative truth* in the first place? 
 
The above complaints are objections to talking about relative truth*. What if the truth-relativist picks a blander label 
for their central relation? The explanatory structure of the truth-relativist theory is unchanged if we use label ‘T’ for 
the relation between judges and propositions, instead of ‘truth*’. On the view to be considered, my judgement is 
metaphysically correct because the T relation holds between me and the proposition that <the curry is delicious>. Such 
a theory, which postulates both the T relation and metaphysical correctness, is less theoretically economical than 
Finean non-factualism. Finean non-factualism dispenses with the T relation, and claims about it, apparently without 
cost. Whatever we call it, relative truth* is an unnecessary intermediary between the psychological facts and the 
metaphysical correctness of judgements. (One could reply that relative truth* is not an intermediary ontologically 
speaking, because metaphysical correctness just is truth* relative to the judge. This view is particularly vulnerable to 
the thought that we should just use the terminology of ‘metaphysical correctness’, which is less confusing than talk of 
‘relative truth*’.)24 
 
I have argued that there is no gain in clarity, nor any explanatory benefit, to using relative truth* to understand THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. On the contrary, unworldly truth-relativism is more opaque and less 
explanatorily elegant than Finean non-factualism. 
 
I don’t think the cited truth-relativists are motivated to introduce relative truth* by a mistaken assessment of these 
theoretical virtues. I think they assume that relativism must show up in one’s semantic theory. Inspired by Kaplan’s 
framework (1989), they also assume a semantic theory must give some kind of truth-condition to sentences. They 
conclude that relativism should be formulated as a semantic theory that attributes relative truth*. The next section 
casts doubt on the assumption that relativism must show up in one’s semantic theory. Finean non-factualism about 
deliciousness is happily combined with a semantics that is silent on metaphysical issues like relativism. 
 
8. Metaphysics Separated from Linguistics. 
 
I just suggested that truth-relativism is motivated by the assumption that relativism must take the form of a non-
standard approach to the semantics of natural language. (The expressivism of Blackburn (1993) and Gibbard (2003) 
also takes a semantic form.) I reject that assumption: Finean non-factualism is a metaphysical theory, and it lets 
linguists give a semantic theory for a natural language in whatever form they see fit.25 To illustrate, I will argue that 
Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is happily combined with a direct reference or model-theoretic invariantist 
semantics for the word “delicious”. If that’s right, the motive for postulating relative truth* is removed. 
 
Finean non-factualism is quasi-realist: it is meant to legitimize our ordinary judgements about the relevant subject-
matter.26 The non-factualist holds it is metaphysically correct for me to judge that the curry is delicious. The non-
factualist should also hold it is metaphysically correct for me to judge that the curry has the property of being delicious. 
The non-factualist should also hold it is metaphysically correct for anyone to judge that: the word “delicious” refers 
in English to the property of being delicious. So giving a ‘direct reference’ semantics in that way is compatible with 
non-factualism about deliciousness. 
 
  
                                                          
24 A further point: I think claims about truth* are only used to explain which judgements are metaphysically correct. (Some of those judgements 
have contents like: <My Dad is wrong>, or <I was wrong>.) But the only claims that explain correctness are of the form: J1’s judgement that p is 
true* relative to J1. So the truth-relativist theory contains lots of explanatorily idle claims of the form: J1’s judgement that p is true* relative to J2, 
where J1≠J2. 
25 A truth-relativist could adopt the approach to semantics I recommend to the Finean non- factualist. That’s not the view of the truth-relativists 
cited, and it would leave truth-relativism unmotivated. 
26 The antifactualist should be a quasi-realist and attribute to the nonfactual all those features that were traditionally thought to belong to the factual 
… [Non-factual propositions] will be capable of being true or false, believed or asserted, embedded in larger linguistic contexts, and so on.” (Fine 
2001 p. 5) 
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Plausibly, it is also metaphysically correct for anyone to judge that the delicious things form a set.27 If so, it is 
metaphysically correct to judge that the set of delicious things is the extension of the English word “delicious”. So 
giving an extensional model- theoretic semantics is compatible with non-factualism about deliciousness. Of course 
my Dad and I will disagree about which set is the extension of “delicious”; but that won’t impede our collaborative 
semantic theorizing, any more than does our disagreement about the extension of an objective term like “is over 6 foot 
tall”. We can agree that “delicious” is assigned some set of objects—the delicious ones—and not a semantic value of 
some other type, and that’s enough agreement for the purposes of linguistics. 
 
Nor is there a problem, given non-factualism, with linguists saying that other things could have been delicious, forming 
a different set than the actually delicious things. For the purpose of capturing content, we can define possible worlds 
in terms of ‘minimal’ facts, including whether a particular curry is delicious (Glanzberg 2009 pp. 295–6, 304– 5). So 
it is metaphysically correct for anyone to judge that there is a function that maps pairs, consisting of a possible world 
and an object, to the True if the object is delicious at that world, and to the False otherwise. We can assign that function 
as the semantic value of the English word “delicious”. So giving an intensional model-theoretic semantics is 
compatible with non-factualism about deliciousness. Given that we’ve built facts about what’s delicious into our 
possible worlds, my Dad and I will agree about which function is the semantic value of “delicious”, but will disagree 
about which possible world is actual. Again, this disagreement is irrelevant to our semantic theorizing. 
 
Moving to Kaplan’s (1989) framework for understanding indexicality poses no further problem. My Dad and I agree 
that “delicious” maps every context of use to the same function from worlds and objects to truth-values. That is, we 
agree that “delicious” gets an invariantist not contextualist semantics (and we agree on exactly what that semantic 
value is). (Theodore Sider similarly isolates linguistics from metaphysics: 2011 pp. 112–5, 122–4.) 
 
However, I think that the non-factualist must deny that the canvassed approaches to semantics tell us what meanings 
literally are; rather they give models of meaning that are useful for some explanatory tasks, though not for others. I’ll 
focus on the issue with model-theoretic approaches. The non-factualist takes the content or meaning of “delicious” to 
be such that the word is metaphysically correctly applied by some judges to some objects, and incorrectly applied on 
other occasions. But the extension and intension of “delicious” do not determine the conditions for a judge’s applying 
the word metaphysically correctly. So meanings are not literally speaking such sets or functions. 
 
I don’t think this is worrying, as long as we can maintain that the relevant sets are useful models of meanings for the 
purposes of linguistics. They just aren’t useful models of meanings for the purposes of metaphysics—specific 
explanatory purposes warrant specific idealizations. This defence sharply separates the phenomena to be explained by 
metaphysics from those to be explained by linguistics, of which semantics is a branch. For example, the fact that my 
Dad and I can express disagreement about whether the curry is delicious falls under the purview of semantics; but that 
our judgements are both metaphysically correct falls under the purview of metaphysics. A detailed defence of this 
separation of subject-matters is beyond the scope of this paper, but let me sketch a line of argument. Semantics should 
explain how we communicate by exploiting linguistic conventions. I conjecture that there is no difference in kind 
between how people exploit linguistic conventions to communicate about what’s delicious, and about an objective 
matter such as what’s a table. Roughly: people appropriately associate a word with a concept, and take other people 
to do so too. (Things are more complicated for plenty of other words, including “if” and “most”.) If communication 
works the same way whether the subject-matter is relative or objective, then the relativity of deliciousness should not 
show up in the model of meaning used by semantics. 
 
I have suggested that a Finean non-factualist can give an invarianist semantics for “delicious” of a familiar kind. 
Invariantism straightforwardly explains why my Dad and I disagree. Any invariantist view must treat pragmatically 
certain phenomena some philosophers want to treat semantically. I will briefly consider one example (without 
pretending to settle it, let alone every case). Stephenson (2007), Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009 pp. 132–4) and Jonathan 
Schaffer (2011 §2.1) claim that a semantics must explain why “Everyone had a delicious meal” can be used to mean 
that everyone had a meal that they found delicious, rather than that all the meals were delicious simpliciter. It is 
independently plausible that this phenomenon is pragmatic (cf. Lasersohn 2005 p. 681, MacFarlane 2014 pp. 155–
162). Consider the felicity of: “Everyone was given a gold ring that turned out to be brass” (Holton 1997). I don’t 
think the semantic theory should say that “gold” sometimes means gold, and sometimes means taken by some salient 
person x to be gold. Rather, the latter meaning is sometimes recovered pragmatically as a conversational implicature. 
                                                          
27 I am ignoring certain irrelevant issues, such as the vagueness in how delicious something must be in order to be delicious tout court. 
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Analogously, the semantics can say that “delicious” means delicious simpliciter, and leave the rest to pragmatics. The 
analogy is bolstered by the non-literal feel of “Everyone had a delicious meal”, supposing the speaker is repulsed by 
the jellied eels her companions ate and enjoyed. 
 
9. Developing and Elucidating Finean Non-Factualism. 
 
How are we to elucidate the notion of metaphysical correctness, and the Finean non- factualist approach? I endorse 
the methodology articulated by Kit Fine (2001) and Theodore Sider (2011 pp. 8–10). On this approach, metaphysical 
notions are not to be defined in more familiar terms. Metaphysical notions are clarified by building a theory that links 
some of them together, and glosses a host of appealing but hazy metaphysical thoughts. It is familiar that some notions 
are grasped by grasping a theory in which they appear; it is plausible that our grasp of metaphysical notions is tightened 
in such a manner. Once a metaphysical theory has been presented, we assess whether it sheds light on things. There 
is no prior question as to whether we understand the notions the theory uses. 
 
The so-called ‘problem of creeping minimalism’ in meta-ethics (Dreier 2004) illustrates the need for special 
metaphysical notions. The problem is that expressivism cannot be formulated using familiar ordinary notions, as they 
apply in the same way to morality as to uncontroversially objective matters. For example, it is an undeniable platitude 
that there are moral beliefs, which can be true or false. I agree with Fine (2001) that expressivism must therefore be 
formulated using extra-ordinary, peculiarly metaphysical notions. (I also agree that the relevant notion is that of 
metaphysically correct judgement: expressivism is best formulated as a particular Finean non-factualist theory about 
morality.28) 
 
The rest of this section applies the methodology described above. I build a theory about metaphysical correctness, 
glossing some attractive but hazy metaphysical ideas. In doing so I depart from Fine’s views. A clearer metaphysical 
picture emerges, I hope, thereby improving our grasp on metaphysical correctness. 
 
We can define ‘factualism’ about a proposition p as the view that what makes a judgement that p metaphysically 
correct is: that p. Non-factualism explains the correctness of a judgement that p in other terms. For example: what 
makes it metaphysically correct for J to judge that the curry is delicious is that the curry tastes good to J. We get a 
nicer package if we are non-factualists about tables, cities, etc., as well as deliciousness. For example: it is the 
arrangement of particles in a certain region that makes it metaphysically correct for anyone to judge that there’s a 
table there (and metaphysically incorrect for anyone to deny it). This proposal does not collapse the metaphysical 
difference between deliciousness and tables: unlike judgements about the presence of a table, whether it is correct to 
attribute deliciousness to a given dish can vary between judges. We can define: ‘relativism’ is true about a proposition 
p iff whether it is metaphysically correct for J to judge that p depends on facts about J (qua judge). So even given non-
factualism about what’s delicious and about the presence of tables, only the former subject-matter is relative. 
 
I will describe two advantages to non-factualism about deliciousness, tables, and indeed everything metaphysically 
non-fundamental. Firstly, it allows us to gloss the hazy metaphysical contrast between something’s being a part of 
reality-as-it-is-in-itself, versus being a human ‘projection’ onto reality. Let’s call the former view ‘realism’ about a 
subject-matter. In Fine’s (2001) terminology, realism says there are ‘facts-in-reality’ about the subject-matter. If it is 
a fact-in-reality that p and one judges that p, one thereby ‘carves nature at the joints’.29 Its being a fact-in-reality that 
p makes it metaphysically correct for anyone to judge that p. I accept a converse principle too: if it is not a fact-in- 
reality that p, but it is metaphysically correct for some people to judge that p, then it is something other than p that 
makes such judgements correct. For example, it is metaphysically correct for me to judge that the curry is delicious, 
because I enjoy the curry—not because the curry is delicious. Similarly, it is metaphysically correct for anyone to 
judge that there is a table here, because of the arrangement of particles in the area—not because there is a table here. 
These non-factualist accounts gloss the venerable idea that we ‘project’ deliciousness and tables onto the world. 
Judgements attributing deliciousness ‘project’ from our tastes; judgements about tables ‘project’ from the arrangement 
of particles. I think this helps make sense of the idea that there are no facts-in-reality about the presence of tables (Fine 
2001).30 
                                                          
28 As I explain in footnote 22, Dreier (2004) focuses on a mistaken aspect of Fine’s account. 
29 ‘Carving nature at the joints’ is an expression prominently employed by Sider (2011). I don’t mean to endorse his way of precisifying the idea. 
30 Fine (2001) cannot say these nice things because he rejects non-factualism about tables, cities, and the like. He says truths about tables are 
‘reducible’: they are not facts-in-reality, but they are ultimately grounded in facts-in-reality. According to Fine, a reducible truth p is not a fact-in-
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The second advantage of non-factualism about everything other than the facts-in- reality is that, suitably extended, it 
allows for an attractive treatment of vagueness (spelled out in my MS). The first extension is to assess judgements in 
a more fine-grained way than simply as being metaphysically correct or incorrect. We assign judgements a degree of 
goodness, and assess whether they are good enough or ‘acceptable’. We also grade the attitude of suspending 
judgement, and combinations of attitudes. As an example of the latter, it is very bad to: judge that a given shade is red 
and judge that it is orange. Then we can give non-factualist accounts of vague domains of discourse that say the 
following three nice things, starting with two conceptions of ‘borderline’ cases. Firstly, there are some questions for 
which, for any judge, the underlying facts make either answer metaphysically acceptable. Secondly, there are questions 
for which suspending judgement is metaphysically acceptable (glossing the intuition that one does not thereby ‘miss 
out on a hidden fact of the matter’). Thirdly, the sorites paradox poses a question to which no response is 
metaphysically acceptable. 
 
If this account of vagueness is right, then the notions of metaphysically correct or acceptable judgement do a lot of 
philosophical work. The framework is not justified simply in virtue of its account of deliciousness. In particular, I 
argue in Jackson (2010) that a similar account of vagueness cannot be given in terms of relative truth. That’s an 
important reason for theorizing in terms of metaphysical acceptability instead. 
 
The following picture might shed light on what we are up to when we talk about metaphysical correctness. Suppose 
that one thinks that talk about tables, or what’s morally wrong, does not carve nature at the joints. We can distinguish 
two reactions. The ‘fundamentalist’ temperament is horrified, and concludes that the relevant judgements are 
illegitimate—in my terms, they are all metaphysically incorrect. That is, the fundamentalist adopts an error theory 
about the relevant domain of discourse. By contrast, the ‘pragmatist’ temperament is perfectly relaxed: the relevant 
judgements are legitimate though they do not carve nature at the joints. The pragmatist owes us an explanation of why 
such judgements are legitimate, i.e. what makes them metaphysically correct. That is, the pragmatist should give a 
non-factualist account of the area of discourse. As talk of temperaments and emotional reactions suggests, I am a 
relativist about metaphysical correctness, as for deliciousness and moral goodness. (More carefully: I am a relativist 
about the metaphysical correctness of judgements that do not carve nature at the joints. When it is a fact-in-reality that 
p, p makes it correct for anyone to judge that <it is metaphysically correct for anyone to judge that p>.) 
 
This section sketched a theory framed in terms of metaphysically correct or acceptable judgement. If one understands 
the theory and finds it illuminating, then the same goes for the central notion it employs. There is no other way, I 
suggest, to clarify metaphysical concepts. Of course a philosopher could insist that she just doesn’t get what I’ve been 
talking about. But such a philosopher will have no sympathy for the project of making sense of THE 
EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE. Those of us who are sympathetic to relativism, and the other metaphysical 





THE EVENHANDEDNESS MONOLOGUE captures the core relativist thought about deliciousness. I distinguished 
three ways of relating relative truth to worldly states of affairs. I argued that the relativist should reject all three 
versions of truth-relativism in favour of theorizing directly in terms of metaphysically correct judgement, in the 
manner of Kit Fine’s non-factualist. While metaphysically bold, the approach is linguistically conservative.31 
 
  
                                                          
reality, but our judgements that p are still made metaphysically correct or not by whether p. (Reducible truths are still ‘factual’.) That is, our 
judgements are to be understood metaphysically as engaging with p’s being the case. We don’t ‘project’ tables onto the world, but neither are they 
constituents of any facts-in-reality. I find this combination baffling; things are clearer if we reject Fine’s category of ‘reducible’ truths. 
31 I would like to thank the following for helpful comments and conversations: Corine Besson, Andrew Cortens, Stephen Crowley, Kit Fine, John 
Hawthorne, Brian Kierland, Angel Pinillos, Ted Sider, Ernie Sosa, several anonymous reviewers, and those attending a meeting of the LEM forum 
at the University of London’s Institute of Philosophy. 
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